ICR Research #21: Silicon Valley's global soft power machine

Author: Stuart MacDonald

“When Silicon Valley platforms determine information flows and shape public discourse, traditional diplomatic and cultural instruments lose their centrality.”

This article follows our previous analysis of non-state actors in global affairs, where we identified Silicon Valley as one of the most consequential forces reshaping international relations beyond traditional state-to-state channels. Of the ten influential non-state actors we examined, Silicon Valley's technological ecosystem represented a unique concentration of influence that warranted deeper investigation. Unlike traditional soft power that flows through cultural exports and diplomatic initiatives, Silicon Valley's influence operates through technological dependencies and platform control that creates systemic importance across multiple domains simultaneously.

The concentration of technological power in Silicon Valley represents a fundamental shift in how influence is exercised globally. With a combined market capitalisation of $14.3 trillion and control over critical digital infrastructure serving billions of users, the region operates as a quasi-sovereign entity whose decisions shape global technology standards, cultural norms, and economic structures in ways that challenge conventional foreign policy frameworks.

The architecture of technological hegemony

Silicon Valley's soft power infrastructure operates through interconnected networks where the "Big Five" technology companies—Apple, Microsoft, Nvidia, Google/Alphabet, and Meta—collectively control essential digital infrastructure. Google's control of approximately 92% of global search traffic positions it as the primary information gateway for billions worldwide, whilst Meta's platforms connect 3.96 billion monthly active users across Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp. Through algorithmic news feed curation, content moderation policies, and recommendation systems, Meta's platforms shape which political discussions, news stories, and cultural topics gain visibility, though this influence operates through cumulative algorithmic choices rather than deliberate editorial control.

In 2024, Silicon Valley startups captured 57% of all US venture capital funding, creating network effects where successful entrepreneurs, investors, and talent gravitate toward the region. This concentration extends beyond capital allocation to norm-setting: Silicon Valley's venture capital firms manage approximately $85 billion in assets and often require portfolio companies to adopt Silicon Valley management practices, creating a multiplier effect for the region's business culture globally.

The economic model pioneered in Silicon Valley—platform-based business models, network effects, and venture capital-fuelled growth—has become the template for global technology companies. This creates what economists term "platform capitalism," where Silicon Valley companies capture value from global economic activity through their technological infrastructure whilst exporting particular innovation philosophies and technological paradigms.

Values, ideology, and the erosion of democratic discourse

Silicon Valley's influence extends beyond technological infrastructure to the propagation of specific values and ideological frameworks that increasingly shape global policy debates. The region's libertarian-technocratic ideology combines support for globalisation, belief in technology as a solution to social problems, and faith in meritocracy—values that have become embedded in policy discussions worldwide despite their contentious nature and limited democratic legitimacy.

Recent developments reveal the profound implications of this ideological export. Meta's decision in January 2025 to end fact-checking programmes and roll back diversity initiatives demonstrates how corporate decisions in California can reshape global information ecosystems without democratic oversight. The EU's Digital Services Act confronts Silicon Valley precisely because platform policies on content moderation and algorithmic curation effectively determine what constitutes acceptable speech across much of the global internet.

The implications for free expression are particularly troubling. When Silicon Valley platforms control the digital infrastructure through which most global political discourse occurs, their policies about misinformation, hate speech, and political advertising become de facto global speech regulations imposed without democratic deliberation. The "marketplace of ideas" that underpins liberal democratic theory becomes subject to Silicon Valley's interpretation of optimal discourse management, often prioritising engagement and profitability over democratic values.

This tension has intensified with Silicon Valley's embrace of the Trump administration. Tech executives' attendance at Trump's inauguration and subsequent policy reversals signal a troubling willingness to subordinate platform governance to American political preferences. For countries beyond the United States, this creates the uncomfortable reality that their citizens' access to information and ability to participate in democratic discourse depends on the political calculations of American corporations aligned with a particular political faction.

Political capture and the instrumentalisation of Silicon Valley

Rather than operating as independent actors, Silicon Valley companies have become increasingly integrated into American geopolitical strategy, challenging narratives about their autonomy and raising questions about their reliability as neutral technological providers. The Department of Defense and U.S. intelligence communities awarded approximately $53 billion in contracts to major tech firms between 2019 and 2022, whilst venture capital investment in defence technology reached over $100 billion from 2021 through 2023. In 2024 alone, the Pentagon saw a 2.3x increase in spending on the top 100 venture-backed defence technology companies.

This integration intensified following Trump's return to office in 2025, with tech executives attending his inauguration and subsequently aligning their platforms with administration priorities. OpenAI launched its "OpenAI for Government" initiative in June 2025, securing a $200 million "frontier AI" pilot with the Department of Defense, whilst Anthropic launched Claude Gov for U.S. defence and intelligence agencies. These developments signal deeper operational engagement between Silicon Valley and American national security apparatus.

The weaponisation of technological dependencies has become explicit through export controls on AI chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China, whilst companies like Starlink provide critical military infrastructure that the U.S. government leverages for geopolitical purposes. Recent events in Ukraine illustrate this dynamic starkly: in February 2025, U.S. negotiators reportedly threatened to cut Ukraine's access to Starlink terminals unless Kyiv agreed to a $500 billion minerals deal, with Musk himself acknowledging that "their entire front line would collapse if I turned it off." This demonstrates how Silicon Valley's infrastructure has become an instrument of American statecraft, with private companies' decisions subject to geopolitical calculations.

This political integration undermines claims about Silicon Valley's global neutrality and exposes other countries' vulnerabilities when depending on American technological infrastructure. Europeans are moving away from Starlink as quickly as they can, with the European Commission investigating how it can support domestic alternatives. The prospect of technological decoupling looms as countries recognise that dependence on Silicon Valley infrastructure subjects them to American political priorities.

The concentration of AI development in Silicon Valley companies—OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, and Microsoft—positions the region at the centre of the next technological transformation whilst embedding these capabilities within American geopolitical strategy. Export controls on advanced computing items and semiconductor manufacturing equipment reveal how technological leadership becomes an instrument of power projection.

Implications for UK foreign policy and soft power decline

Silicon Valley's consolidation occurs precisely as China has surpassed the UK to rank 2nd with a score of 72.8 out of 100 in global soft power rankings for the first time. Britain's decline to third place reflects not only China's strategic investments but also the UK's failure to adapt to technological transformations that render traditional soft power instruments increasingly obsolete.

The UK Soft Power Group's latest report explores the urgent need for the UK to better leverage its soft power, to maintain and strengthen its global position in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. Yet Silicon Valley's dominance complicates this ambition by creating alternative channels of influence that operate independently of British institutions. When Silicon Valley platforms determine information flows and shape public discourse, traditional diplomatic and cultural instruments lose their centrality.

The security implications extend beyond commercial relationships to questions of national resilience. When British businesses rely on American cloud computing services, mobile operating systems, and digital platforms, questions arise about the UK's ability to maintain regulatory autonomy or pursue policies that diverge from American interests. Managing the risks of China's access to US data and control of software and connected technology highlights how technological dependencies create vulnerabilities that hostile powers can exploit.

Denmark became the first nation to appoint an ambassador to Silicon Valley in 2017, with Minister Jeppe Kofod emphasising the need to ensure governments "set the boundaries for the tech industry and not the other way around." The UK's more cautious response—appointing a tech envoy rather than a full ambassador—perhaps reflects British reluctance to formally acknowledge Silicon Valley's quasi-sovereign status whilst revealing the inadequacy of traditional diplomatic frameworks for engaging with technological power.

Cultural hegemony and the undermining of national soft power infrastructures

Silicon Valley's cultural influence operates through the global adoption of its innovation philosophy, creating what researchers describe as a process whereby the region's distinctive approaches to thinking and working spread globally through both formal and informal mechanisms. The region's core values—disruption mentality, rapid iteration, scalability obsession, and technological solutionism—have become global business orthodoxy whilst undermining alternative approaches to economic development and social organisation.

Silicon Valley is seeking to reform education in its own image, as part of a 'techno-economic revolution' that is spreading globally. Companies like ClassDojo bypass traditional policy channels to shape educational practice directly, with their "growth mindset" and behaviour tracking approaches spreading globally without democratic deliberation. This represents a fundamental challenge to national educational sovereignty as Silicon Valley companies determine pedagogical approaches through technological infrastructure rather than democratic policy processes.

The implications for British cultural production are particularly significant. Job advertisements of four US and UK print-legacy news outlets reveal how Silicon Valley's quantified approach to audience relationships increasingly shapes British media practices. When British newspapers emphasise data analysis skills and digital engagement metrics in hiring, they reflect Silicon Valley's transformation of journalism from public service to audience engagement optimisation.

Investment in UK soft power falls as competition for global influence increases, with the British Council's support decreasing by £12 million from 2023 to 2024. This disinvestment in traditional soft power infrastructure occurs precisely as Silicon Valley consolidates its control over the digital channels through which cultural influence increasingly operates. The result is a double disadvantage: Britain reduces investment in traditional soft power whilst becoming more dependent on American-controlled technological infrastructure for cultural projection.

The limits of technological sovereignty

Silicon Valley's influence faces increasing challenges, but these constraints reveal the depth of global technological dependencies rather than genuine alternatives. The EU's Digital Markets Act designates six "gatekeepers"—all Silicon Valley companies except ByteDance—and imposes operational restrictions, yet compliance costs remain manageable for companies with trillion-dollar market capitalisations.

Chinese tech ecosystems present the most significant challenge, with Beijing serving as the "AI Capital" with 25% of China's top universities and national laboratories whilst Shenzhen functions as the hardware innovation hub. However, these alternative ecosystems remain largely dependent on Silicon Valley's software infrastructure and investment validation, demonstrating the region's continued gravitational pull.

European efforts to develop technological sovereignty face structural disadvantages. Top 10 European tech hubs competing with Silicon Valley have carved out specific niches—London in fintech, Berlin in B2B technology—but lack the comprehensive ecosystem that enables Silicon Valley's influence across multiple domains simultaneously.

Conclusion: Technological dependency and democratic accountability

Silicon Valley's soft power represents a qualitatively different form of global influence that operates through technological dependencies rather than cultural attraction or diplomatic persuasion. Unlike traditional soft power that requires ongoing consent and cultural affinity, technological dependency creates structural relationships that persist regardless of political preferences or cultural alignment.

The challenge for democratic societies lies in developing mechanisms for accountability and oversight when essential infrastructure is controlled by private actors operating beyond traditional sovereignty. The Silicon Valley model and technological trajectories in context reveals how the region's success creates "extreme concentrations of wealth and power in a handful of big tech firms" that exercise quasi-governmental functions without democratic legitimacy.

For Britain, Silicon Valley's influence reveals how technological infrastructure has become the foundation upon which traditional soft power instruments depend. The UK's cultural exports increasingly rely on Silicon Valley platforms for distribution; its educational influence operates through American-controlled digital channels; its diplomatic engagement requires navigating relationships mediated by technological intermediaries. This structural transformation suggests that soft power strategy can no longer treat technology as merely instrumental but must recognise it as constitutive of contemporary influence itself.

The dilemma facing British policymakers reflects a broader tension between the benefits of technological integration and the costs of structural dependency. Silicon Valley's platforms provide unprecedented reach for British cultural content and facilitate global connections that traditional diplomatic channels cannot match. Yet this access comes with subordination to algorithmic curation, content policies, and business models designed to serve Silicon Valley's commercial and political interests rather than British strategic objectives.

The evolution of Denmark's tech diplomacy illustrates this challenge. Despite appointing the first ambassador to Silicon Valley in 2017, Denmark's influence over platform governance remains limited whilst its digital infrastructure dependencies have deepened. This suggests that even proactive engagement with Silicon Valley may not resolve the fundamental asymmetry between technological providers and dependent users. Countries may find themselves negotiating from positions of structural weakness regardless of their diplomatic sophistication or strategic importance.

The emergence of technological sovereignty as a policy objective across multiple countries—from the EU's digital autonomy initiatives to China's indigenous innovation programmes—reflects growing recognition that technological dependency constrains political autonomy in ways that traditional economic relationships do not. Unlike trade relationships that can be diversified or renegotiated, technological dependencies often involve lock-in effects, network externalities, and switching costs that make alternative arrangements prohibitively expensive or technically unfeasible.

The convergence of technological capability and geopolitical influence reveals how countries failing to develop indigenous technological capabilities may find themselves increasingly subject to decisions made in Silicon Valley boardrooms. This dependency relationship differs qualitatively from traditional forms of economic interdependence because technological infrastructure shapes the very mechanisms through which soft power operates. Understanding this transformation requires recognising that the question facing British policymakers is not simply whether to engage with Silicon Valley, but how to navigate a world where technological infrastructure has become the medium through which international influence increasingly flows, rather than merely one instrument among many for projecting national power.

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