ICR Research #5: Post-Liberal Soft Power: American Attraction after Munich
Author: Hendrik W. Ohnesorge
Dr. Hendrik Ohnesorge is a member of the ICR Research network of academics and practitioners. He is also the Managing Director of the Center for Global Studies (CGS) at the University of Bonn as well as Lecturer and Research Fellow at the Chair in International Relations, Institute for Political Science and Sociology, University of Bonn. Since September 2023, he has been Non-resident Visiting Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Global Affairs (CGA) at New York University.
Much Ado About Munich
With his much-anticipated speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 14, 2025, U.S. Vice President J. D. Vance has severely ruffled European feathers. In more ways than one, the speech represents—on pain of overuse of the term—a transatlantic Zeitenwende.
Not only did the U.S. Vice President, in his own words, advocate for a “reasonable settlement between Russia and Ukraine”—presumably above the heads of European states and, as a matter of fact, Ukraine itself—he also made unmistakably clear the necessity “in the coming years for Europe to step up in a big way to provide for its own defense.” These were largely expected overtures, and countless U.S. decision-makers had demanded the same of a continually sleepwalking Europe for decades—to little avail.
What really startled the audience as much as anything in the Munich speech, however, was, again in Vance’s words, the alleged “retreat of Europe from some of its most fundamental values—values shared with the United States of America.” Following that rebuke, Vance launched into an all-out verbal attack against European nations and scolded them for alleged suppression of free speech, tendencies of censorship, and the exclusion of undesirable voices.
The outcry was as swift as it was ripe with indignation. European and especially German political leaders were neither prepared for nor were they taken by what was, in effect, a transatlantic Philippic.
While this is not the place to assess the speech and its meaning for Europe in greater detail, Vance made clear that henceforth the transatlantic relationship would be governed by new logic.
Gone, apparently, are the days of shared world views and common visions of the future, of the traditions of multilateralism and international cooperation, of attracting and persuading your partners to be at your side when the going gets rough.
The Trump administration, in short, forsook soft power—and where it still draws on it, it shows a very different face.
Post-Liberal Soft Power
Soft power refers to the ability to get desired outcomes on the world stage not by coercion or inducements, but by the forces of attraction and persuasion. Coined by my friend and colleague Joseph S. Nye some thirty years ago, it traditionally rests on a country’s culture, its values, and its policies. Additionally, as I have explored elsewhere, leading personalities from the political and other spheres play a key role for a country’s attraction-based influence as well.
A distinctly non-normative form of power, much of its potency flows from leading by example, from one’s credibility, and from an alignment of one’s words and deeds.
Amidst different global power shifts in the making today, we currently observe a rise in what I propose to call the post-liberal face of soft power.
It’s a form of attraction-based influence which increasingly departs from liberal principles such as multilateralism, institutional cooperation or human rights. Post-liberal soft power, instead, at its very core rests on unilateralism, transactionalism, and an appeal to strongman politics.
This face of soft power is not new per se. However, the United States of America under Donald Trump for the first time has become its main exporter: casting doubt as to the value of alliances and institutions, strong-arming even its closest allies to comply in economic and security matters, and routinely disregarding global public opinion.
First outcomes of that new brand of soft power can already be detected. Whether it’s Javier Milei’s Argentina leaving the World Health Organization or whether it’s decision-makers around the world, like Hungary’s Viktor Orban, trying to cast themselves in Trump’s image. Comparable imitative actions, for instance in development aid after Trump in effect shut down USAID, are likely to follow.
This, in a nutshell, is post-liberal soft power at work. The United States is still leading by example, as it has so long done, but that example has changed dramatically.
Consequently, it may henceforth be more accurate to speak of U.S. soft powers —in the plural—as there now are, to a degree perhaps never seen before, two very different faces of American soft power.
Of course, its traditional incarnation still exudes massive attraction, emanating from other political quarters, from universities, from American civil society. In an age of multipolarization, however, the liberal face of U.S. soft power is now openly challenged from the White House.
The Future of American Attraction
During his Munich speech, J. D. Vance reminded his audience, “In Washington, there is a new sheriff in town.”
That new sheriff seems to be playing by very different rules than all of his post-World War II predecessors.
Certainly, as Gary Cooper has shown us in High Noon (1952), a determined and capable sheriff can take on a whole lot of bad guys, even if he is on his own.
However, in a world beset with major challenges and defiant challengers, a complex world that is a far cry from the Old West of American lore, going at it all alone is not an option anymore, even for the fastest gun around. Every sheriff needs a helping hand from time to time.
In fact, even Gary Cooper did.